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(IM)BALANCE AND (UN)REASONABLENESS: HIGH-SPEED
POLICE PURSUITS, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, AND SCOTT
V. HARRIS
INTRODUCTION
History teaches that suspects, on occasion, flee from police officers.
While this principle has changed very little since the adoption of the
Fourth Amendment in 1791, the appropriate response to a suspect's
flight has changed very much. At the time of the founding, the law per-
mitted officers to simply kill a fleeing felony suspect rather than allow
him to escape;' two centuries later, an officer who uses deadly force
against a fleeing suspect may be liable in constitutional tort.
2
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Scott v. Harris3 is
the latest in a line of cases that seek to construct a framework for deter-
mining when an officer's use of force becomes unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment.4 But Scott, unlike the Court's prior decisions on the
constitutionality of excessive or deadly force, addressed a thoroughly
modem phenomenon: the high-speed pursuit. In an 8-1 decision, the
Court held that an officer may terminate a high-speed pursuit even if
doing so entails great risk to the fleeing suspect.
5
The analysis in Scott, however, is problematic. Although the major-
ity followed the Court's Fourth Amendment precedents by applying a
balancing test to determine the reasonableness of using deadly force to
terminate a high speed pursuit,6 the majority's characterization of the
facts tilted the metaphorical balance in favor of deadly force. This tilting
occurred from the majority's reliance on two questionable factual prem-
ises.
First, to determine the facts of the case, the majority viewed a
videotape of the pursuit shot from dash-mounted cameras on the patrol
cars.7 Although the Northern District of Georgia, the Eleventh Circuit,
and Justice Stevens concluded that jurors could have watched the video-
tape and determined that the officer's use of deadly force was unreason-
1. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 12 (1985) (discussing the history of the common law
rule).
2. See Michael M. Rosen, A Qualified Defense: In Support of the Doctrine of Qualified
Immunity in Excessive Force Cases, With Some Suggestions for its Improvement, 35 GOLDEN GATE
L. REV. 139, 141-43 (2005).
3. 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007).
4. See Garner, 471 U.S. 1; Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
5. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1779.
6. Id. at 1778.
7. Id. at 1775.
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able, the majority held otherwise: it found that the suspect's driving was
so obviously dangerous that no reasonable jury could disagree. But the
substantial differences in interpretation of the videotape voiced in the
opinions of Justice Stevens and the Eleventh Circuit suggest that a rea-
sonable jury could indeed disagree with the majority.
In light of the potential for multiple reasonable interpretations of the
videotape, the majority relied too heavily on its own interpretation of the
videotape to determine the "facts" in Scott. By ignoring others' interpre-
tations of the videotape, the majority tilted the balancing test in favor of
deadly force. The majority's tilting of the balance may make future uses
of deadly force in high-speed pursuits more likely to be found reason-
able, and the majority's rationale for its interpretation of the videotape
seems to undercut well-established summary judgment standards,
thereby giving judges greater interpretational leeway at the summary
judgment stage.
Second, in deciding the reasonableness of the officer's use of deadly
force to terminate the high-speed pursuit, the majority assumed that the
officer had two options at his disposal: complete cessation of the pursuit
or deadly force.9 In reality, however, more than two options existed. An
understanding of pursuit psychology, a restrictive pursuit policy, the use
of devices such as "stopsticks," the photographing of the suspect's li-
cense plate number for apprehension at a later time, and a final loud-
speaker warning were all viable, realistic, and available alternatives to
deadly force.
By ignoring these alternatives, the majority created an artificial di-
chotomy of complete cessation or deadly force that did not fully repre-
sent reality. Because it did not factor in the efficacy of alternatives, this
artificial dichotomy tended to make deadly force appear more reasonable
than it perhaps was. By setting a precedent that relied on this artificial
dichotomy, Scott created the risk that lower courts may not look at all of
an officer's available options to terminate future high-speed pursuits, and
also may have inadvertently discouraged law enforcement agencies from
adopting these alternatives to deadly force.
Part I of this comment discusses the legal background of deadly
force and Fourth Amendment reasonableness. Part II summarizes the
Court's decision in Scott. Part III argues that, although Scott followed
Fourth Amendment precedents in principle, the majority's application of
those precedents, in practice, rested upon questionable factual premises
stemming from the majority's interpretation of the videotape, and the
majority's refusal to account for alternative methods of ending high-
speed pursuits. Part IV concludes this comment.
8. Id. at 1775-76.
9. Id. at 1778.
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I. BACKGROUND 0
The Fourth Amendment provides citizens with a constitutional right
against unreasonable seizures by the government.1" At the time of the
founding, officers were entitled to use deadly force to prevent a fleeing
felon's escape.' 2 Although most American jurisdictions discouraged it,
the option of using deadly force to stop a fleeing felon remained avail-
able well into the twentieth century.' 3 In Tennessee v. Garner,14 how-
ever, the Court held that this common law rule violated the Fourth
Amendment.15  The Court expanded Garner's holding in Graham v.
Connor16 to encompass excessive force under the Fourth Amendment, as
well.' 7 After Garner and Graham, therefore, the Fourth Amendment's
reasonableness standard governed the propriety of an officer's use of
excessive or deadly force. The doctrines developed in both Garner and
Graham are crucial to the Court's Fourth Amendment analysis in Scott.
In Garner, the Court held that an officer who shot an unarmed flee-
ing suspect in the back of the.head in order to prevent his escape violated
the suspect's right against unreasonable seizure.18  The Court came to
this conclusion by balancing the "nature and quality of the intrusion on
the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of
the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion."' 9 Because the
suspect's interest in his own life outweighed the state's interest in captur-
ing him, the Court found that the officer acted unreasonably.
20
Although the Court held that deadly force "may not be used unless
it is necessary to prevent the [suspect's] escape and the officer has prob-
able cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death
or serious physical injury to the officer or others,' it also emphasized
10. The Court granted certiorari to Scott as an interlocutory appeal from summary judgment
against the officer's defense of qualified immunity. Id. at 1773-74. The first step in a qualified
immunity analysis asks whether an officer violated a claimant's constitutional rights. Saucier v.
Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). See generally Karen Blum, Qualified Immunity in the Fourth
Amendment: A Practical Application of § 1983 as it Applies to Fourth Amendment Excessive Force
Cases, 21 TOURO L. REV. 571, 576-80 (2005). Although Scott came to the Court as a qualified
immunity case, Scott's analysis deals only with the first step of the analysis. 127 S. Ct. at 1774,
1776. Because qualified immunity is only tangentially related to the scope of this comment, it will
be dealt with only when necessary to address the Fourth Amendment issues.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... ).
12. 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 5.1(d), at 38 (4th ed. 2004); see also Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 12-16 (1985).
13. 3 LAFAVE, supra note 12, § 5. l (d), at 38.
14. 471 U.S. 1(1985).
15. Garner, 471 U.S. at 10.
16. 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
17. Id. at 388.
18. Garner, 471 U.S. at 3-4.
19. Id. at 8 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983) (internal quotations
omitted)).
20. Id. at 9-10.
21. Id. at 3.
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that Garner's balancing test was fact-driven: an officer's "reasonableness
depends on not only when a seizure is made, but also how it is carried
out. '22 Furthermore, the Court looked to "whether the totality of the
circumstances justified a particular sort of... seizure. 23 In sum, Garner
stood for the proposition that the state's interest in deadly force must be
balanced against the suspect's interest in his life in order to determine
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.
Despite the Court's framing of Garner as a Fourth Amendment is-
sue, there remained confusion in the decisions as to whether excessive
force claims should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's reason-
ableness standard, or the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due proc-
ess approach. 24 In Graham, the Court held that "all claims that law en-
forcement officers have used excessive force-deadly or not-in the
course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other 'seizure' of a free citizen
should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its 'reasonable-
ness' standard .... ,25 This holding not only reaffirmed the balancing
test laid out in Garner, but added "objective reasonableness" to the
analysis.
2 6
Objective reasonableness asks "whether a reasonable police officer
in the same circumstances would have used such force. 2 7 The Court set
out factors to assist in determining objective reasonableness, including
the severity of the crime, the immediacy of the threat, the suspect's resis-
tance, and the potential for evasion. 8 In applying these factors, however,
the Court recognized that "officers are often forced to make split-second
judgments-in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolv-
ing-about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situa-
tion., 29 The trier of fact, therefore, must determine the "'reasonableness'
of a particular use of force.., from the perspective of a reasonable offi-
cer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.
30
After Garner and Graham, therefore, courts determined the Fourth
Amendment reasonableness of excessive or deadly force by balancing
the suspect's interest in his Fourth Amendment rights against the gov-
ernment's interest in the intrusion. If the government's interest in the
intrusion could be deemed objectively reasonable under the circum-
stances, then its intrusion on the suspect's Fourth Amendment rights
would, on a metaphorical balance, be deemed to outweigh the suspect's
22. Id. at 8.
23. Id. at 8-9.
24. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393 (1989); see also 2 WILLIAM E. RINGEL, SEARCHES
& SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS § 22:17, at 48.1 (2d ed. 2007).
25. Graham, 490 U.S. at 395.
26. Id. at 396-97.
27. 2 RINGEL, supra note 24, § 22:17, at 46.
28. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97.
29. Id. at 397.
30. Id. at 396.
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interest in his Fourth Amendment rights. The government's intrusion
would, in short, be reasonable. It is this framework that the majority
used in analyzing the Fourth Amendment question in Scott.
II. SCOTT v. HARPJS
A. Facts
Around 11 o'clock on a Thursday night in 2001, a Coweta County,
Georgia, sheriffs deputy clocked Victor Harris's vehicle traveling 73
miles per hour in a 55 mile-per-hour zone.31 The deputy activated his
lights and siren and pursued Harris, but Harris refused to stop.32 Harris
then led the deputy on a high-speed pursuit down a rural two-lane high-
33way.
Although the pursuit began on an open highway, Harris soon en-
tered Peachtree City, Georgia, and pulled into the parking lot of a shop-
ping center.34 By this time, more officers had responded to the pursuit
and attempted to block the exits from the parking lot with their vehi-
cles.35 One of these officers was Deputy Timothy Scott. 36 The shopping
center was closed for the evening, and the parking lot was empty except
for Harris and the officers. 37 It appeared that Harris had decided to sur-
render, but he suddenly began driving toward the exit of the parking lot
and collided with Deputy Scott's patrol car as he headed back onto the
highway. 38 After this collision, Deputy Scott took over as the lead police
vehicle in the pursuit.
39
Because they were not informed of the underlying reason for the
pursuit, the Peachtree City police did not directly participate in pursuing
Harris. 40  The Peachtree City police did, however, block intersections
along the pursuit route to ensure that cross-traffic would not travel into
Harris's path.4 1 Despite the lessened risk to innocent motorists due to
these roadblocks, Deputy Scott radioed his supervisor for permission to
"take [Harris] out" through a Precision Intervention Technique (PIT)
maneuver.42  Deputy Scott believed, however, that the vehicles were
31. Harris v. Coweta County, No. 01-CV-148, slip op. at I (N.D. Ga. Sept. 25, 2003) (deny-
ing summary judgment in part), revd in part, 433 F.3d 807 (1lth Cir. 2007), rev 'dsub nora. Scott v.
Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007).
32. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1772.
33. Id.
34. Harris, No. 01-CV-148, slip op. at 1.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Brief of Plaintiff/Appellee Victor Harris at 12-13, Harris v. Coweta County, 433 F.3d 807
(1 1th Cir. 2005) (No. 03-15094).
38. Harris, No. 01-CV-148, slip op. at 1.
39. Id. at 2.
40. Brief of Plaintiff/Appellee Victor Harris, supra note 37, at 13.
41. Harris, No. 01-CV-148, slip op. at 1.
42. Harris v. Coweta County, 433 F.3d 807, 811 (11th Cir. 2005), revd sub noam. Scott v.
Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007). To execute a PIT maneuver, an officer pulls his squad car alongside
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traveling too fast to safely execute the PIT maneuver and, instead,
rammed Harris's vehicle from behind with the push bar of his squad
car.43  The collision sent Harris's vehicle careening off the road and
down an embankment.44 The crash, although effectively ending the pur-
suit, left Harris a quadriplegic at 19 years old.4 5
B. Procedural History
Harris filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a civil
cause of action against those who, under color of law, deprive a citizen
of his constitutional rights.46 Harris alleged that Deputy Scott, through
excessive force, violated his Fourth Amendment right against unreason-
able seizure.47 Deputy Scott moved for summary judgment on the basis
of qualified immunity,48 but the Northern District of Georgia denied his
motion, finding sufficient disagreement over issues of material fact to
"warrant submission to a jury. ' 49
On interlocutory appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the Northern
District of Georgia, holding that a reasonable jury could find that Deputy
Scott violated Harris's Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable
seizure. 50  Deputy Scott appealed from this judgment, and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari. 5 '
C. Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court majority held that "[a] police officer's attempt
to terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase that threatens the lives of
innocent bystanders does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even when
it places the fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death. 52
Because Scott came to the Court on interlocutory appeal from sum-
mary judgment, there had been no factual findings by either judge or
jury.53 The Court therefore reviewed the record de novo.54 Although the
the fleeing vehicle and collides with its rear quarter panel. Id. at 810. The force of the collision
causes the fleeing vehicle to spin out and typically brings it to a stop. Id.
43. Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. at 1773.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1785 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
47. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1773.
48. See discussion of qualified immunity supra note 10.
49. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1773.
50. Id. at 1773-74.
51. Id. at 1774.
52. Id. at 1779.
53. Id. at 1774.
54. Id. at 1774-75. Though the majority did not specifically label its review de novo, its
independent reexamination of the facts and law for the purpose of summary judgment suggests that
standard. See I STEVEN ALAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW
§ 5-02, at 5-10 to -Il (3d ed. 1999) ("[W]hile the language of material fact often is thought of as the
'standard of review' for summary judgments, it is more precisely the actual, substantive test applied
by all courts. The appellate review standard is de novo ... since the sufficiency issue is a question
of law.").
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majority recognized that courts are usually "required to view the facts
and draw reasonable inferences 'in the light most favorable to the party
opposing the [summary judgment] motion,"' 55 the majority found that, in
this case, a videotape showing the entire chase "so utterly discredited"
Harris's version of the facts that "no reasonable jury could have believed
him., 56 Accordingly, the majority held, no genuine factual dispute ex-
isted.57
Having absolved itself of a need to rely on a jury to determine the
facts, the majority decided the reasonableness of Deputy Scott's actions
as a "pure question of law., 58 Though the majority found it "clear from
the videotape that [Harris] posed an actual and imminent threat" to by-
standers, it also found it "clear that Scott's actions posed a high likeli-
hood of serious injury or death to [Harris] . . . ,59 Despite the fact that
the likelihood of injury to Harris as a result of the seizure was probably
greater than the likelihood of Harris's injuring bystanders, the majority
found that Harris's culpability put on him-rather than innocent by-
standers-the onus of injury. 60 After balancing the risk of injury to Har-
ris against Deputy Scott's interest in protecting the public, the majority
concluded that Deputy Scott was reasonable in pushing Harris's car off
the road.61
Harris, however, argued that Deputy Scott's action was in fact un-
reasonable.62 Harris first tried to analogize his case to Garner, arguing
that Deputy Scott's action was "per se unreasonable" because it did not
meet Garner's preconditions for the use of deadly force.63 Harris argued
that Garner required that the suspect pose a threat of immediate harm to
officers or others, that the suspect would have escaped but for the use of
deadly force, and that the officer must have given the suspect some
warning before using deadly force. 64 Although the majority tacitly ad-
mitted that these preconditions were not met, it nevertheless dismissed
Harris's argument on the basis of Garner's "vastly different facts.
65
The suspect in Garner was unarmed, on foot, and could not have rea-
sonably been considered a threat, the Court noted.6 6 Such facts were not
55. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1774.
56. Id. at 1776.
57. Id. (explaining that on a motion for summary judgment, "[w]hen opposing parties tell two
different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury
could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion
for summary judgment").
58. Id. at 1776 n.8.
59. Id. at 1778.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1777-78.
63. Id. at 1777; see discussion of Garner supra p. 465.
64. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1777.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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"even remotely comparable to the extreme danger to human life posed by
[Harris] in this case. 67
Harris next claimed that had the police simply ceased their pursuit,
Harris would have stopped driving recklessly and the public would have
thus been protected without the use of deadly force. 68 The majority re-
jected this argument outright, noting that while ramming Harris's car off
of the road "was certain to eliminate the risk that [Harris] posed to the
public, ceasing pursuit was not., 69 The majority pointed out that if the
police had ceased their pursuit, there was no way to know whether Harris
would continue driving recklessly or not.
70
D. Concurring Opinions
Justice Breyer and Justice Ginsburg each offered concurring opin-
ions. Justice Breyer noted that he disagreed with the majority's articula-
tion of a per se rule of Fourth Amendment reasonableness.71 Calling
Scott's rule "too absolute" for a Fourth Amendment analysis, Justice
Breyer argued that determining "whether a high-speed chase violates the
Fourth Amendment may well depend upon more circumstances than the
majority's rule reflects.,
72
Taking quite an opposite stance, Justice Ginsburg, whose short con-
currence largely responded to Justice Breyer's criticisms, pointed out that
Scott's rule was not as mechanical or per se as Justice Breyer's concur-
rence suggested. 73 Rather, she argued that Scott's inquiry and subse-
quent rule were "situation specific. 74 Justice Ginsburg listed the risk to
"lives and well-being of others," and the possibility of a safer way of
stopping the fleeing vehicle as "relevant considerations" underlying the
rule."
E. Dissenting Opinion
In the lone dissent, Justice Stevens chastised the majority for its re-
liance on the videotape, its speculation over Harris's behavior, and its
setting what he perceived to be an inflexible rule. Justice Stevens first
cast doubt on the majority's belief that the events on the videotape "bla-
tantly contradicted" the factual determinations of the Eleventh Circuit
and the Northern District of Georgia. 76 Contrary to the majority, Justice
Stevens argued that "the only innocent bystanders" placed at risk were
67. Id.
68. See id. at 1778.
69. Id. at 1778-79.
70. Id. at 1779.
71. Id. at 1781 (Breyer, J., concurring).
72. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
73. Id. at 1779 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
74. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1781 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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"the drivers who either pulled off the road in response to the sirens or
passed [Harris] in the opposite direction when he was driving on his side
of the road."7 7  Justice Stevens next addressed Harris's argument-
rejected by the majority-that the police could have simply ceased pur-
suit and arrested Harris later. 8 The majority, Justice Stevens contended,
had no evidentiary basis for believing that a cessation of pursuit would
not have led to a change in Harris's driving-it simply used the video-
tape to replace "the rule of law with its ad hoc judgment., 79 Finally,
Justice Stevens criticized the majority for ignoring past precedent and
setting faulty future precedent.8 ° Justice Stevens argued that Garner "set
a threshold" for the reasonableness of deadly force, and that the reason-
ableness question should go to a jury.8' The majority's rule, he con-
cluded, "[flies] in the face of the flexible and case-by-case 'reasonable-
ness' approach" of Garner and Graham: the reasonableness of the deci-
82sion should be left up to jurors in Georgia-not justices in Washington.
III. ANALYSIS
The majority, following Garner and Graham, relied on a balancing
test to decide the Fourth Amendment issue in Scott.83 Although the ma-
jority did not include the phrase "balancing test" in its holding, it never-
theless considered "the risk of bodily harm that Scott's actions posed to
[Harris] in light of the threat to the public that Scott was trying to elimi-
nate. 84 The majority's analysis balanced Deputy Scott's interest in "en-
suring public safety" with the "high likelihood of serious injury or death"
to Harris and concluded that Deputy Scott reasonably used deadly
force.8 5 But it is not the majority's application of the balancing test, in
and of itself, that makes the decision in Scott problematic; rather, it is the
"facts" that the majority applied the balancing test to. This comment
argues that the majority tilted the balance toward deadly force by relying
on questionable factual premises stemming from the majority's singular
interpretation of the videotape, and the majority's refusal to consider
available alternatives to deadly force.
A. Interpretation of the Videotape
To determine the threat that Harris's flight posed to the public, and
to thus analyze whether Deputy Scott reasonably used deadly force
against Harris, the majority relied on a videotape of the pursuit from
77. Id. at 1783.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1784.
80. Id. at 1784-85.
81. Id. at 1784.
82. id. at 1785.
83. Id. at 1778.
84. Jd.
85. Jd.
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Deputy Scott's dash-mounted camera.86 Although Justice Scalia quaintly
referred to the videotape as an "added wrinkle" to the Court's usual
adoption of the nonmoving party's version of the facts when determining
the appropriateness of summary judgment,87 in the context of Scott, the
videotape proved to be substantially more than a wrinkle. Indeed, be-
cause the majority relied on its interpretation of the videotape to deter-
mine the "facts," the videotape-and the majority's interpretation of it-
affected the entire outcome of the case.
The majority's reliance on its interpretation of the videotape is
questionable, however, in light of the differing interpretations of the
videotape discussed in opinions by Justice Stevens and the Eleventh Cir-
cuit.ss Despite the interpretations of these presumably reasonable judges,
the majority refused to acknowledge the validity of any interpretation
contrary to its own. Although the majority indeed analyzed the "facts" in
Scott using the balancing test laid out in Garner and Graham, its insis-
tence that the videotape could be interpreted in only one way tilted the
metaphorical balance in favor of deadly force. This tilting is not only apt
to make deadly force in the context of high-speed pursuits more likely to
be adjudged reasonable, but it threatens to undercut well-established
summary judgment standards by giving judges greater interpretational
leeway at the summary judgment stage.
It is well established that summary judgment requires courts to view
the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.89 Only if
"no genuine issue as to any material fact" exists will the moving party be
granted summary judgment.90 Applying this standard and viewing the
facts in the light most favorable to Harris, the Eleventh Circuit concluded
86. The use of videotape in the courtroom is a relatively common occurrence. Karen Martin
Campbell, Note, Roll Tape-Admissibility of Video-Tape Evidence in the Courtroom, 26 U. MEM. L.
REv. 1445, 1451-52 (1996). Its use in a United States Supreme Court decision, however, is some-
what rare: the Court has viewed videotape evidence in only a handful of cases. See, e.g., Saucier v.
Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 212 (2001) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (finding that videotape suggested officer
not solely responsible for alleged excessive force); United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, 529 U.S.
803, 812 (2000) (noting that videotape examples of signal bleed of pornographic programming
showed salaciousness and snow); Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 86-87 (1996), superseded by
statute, Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of
2003, PUB. L. No. 108-21, 401(d)(1), 117 Stat. 670, as recognized in Rita v. United States, 127 S.
Ct. 2456, 2472 (2007) (describing videotaped events of LAPD's beating of Rodney King); Madsen
v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 785-90 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (describing videotape of protest at issue in the case); Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 586
(1990) (determining which portions of defendant's post-DUI arrest videotape should be excluded for
lack of Miranda warning); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 536-37 (1965) (finding that videotape of
the media frenzy at defendant's trial supported defendant's contention of due process deprivation).
87. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1775.
88. See id. at 1781-85 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see Harris v. Coweta County, 433 F.3d 807,
815-17 (11 th Cir. 2005).
89. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962) ("On summary judgment the
inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts ... must be viewed in the light most favorable to
the party opposing the motion.").
90. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
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that a reasonable jury could believe Harris's version of the facts. 91 The
Supreme Court majority, however, after viewing the videotape, con-
cluded that no reasonable jury could believe Harris's version of the facts:
"[flacts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party," it wrote, "only if there is a 'genuine' dispute as to those facts. 92
If a party's version of the events is "so utterly discredited by the record
that no reasonable jury could have believed" it, then "a court should not
adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for
summary judgment."
93
At first blush, the majority's position appears sensible. Surely a
plaintiff whose version of the facts misrepresents what actually happened
should not be given the benefit of the doubt in the face of videotape evi-
dence. Furthermore, ignoring a videotape of the actual events and rely-
ing solely on the pleadings would seem anachronistic in the ubr-tech
environment of the twenty-first century. Indeed, one commentator notes
that plaintiffs sometimes "allege sufficiently egregious facts in order to
clear the summary judgment hurdle" and thereby circumvent the quali-
fied immunity privilege altogether-whether deservedly or not.94  But
the decision in Scott, based as it was on the majority's interpretation of
the videotape, which happened to be quite different from those of Justice
Stevens and the Eleventh Circuit, begs the question of whose interpreta-
tion of the videotape better predicted the inclinations of a reasonable
jury.
Only by watching the videotape-as Justice Breyer invited "inter-
ested reader[s]" to do via a link on the Court's website95 -- can one get a
sense of the disagreement among the majority, Justice Stevens, and the
Eleventh Circuit. Shot in low-resolution black-and-white, with the po-
lice officers' radio traffic barely discernible even when played at high
volume, the videotape depicts the chase from two different police vehi-
cles: the first deputy's (who clocked Harris's speeding), and then Deputy
Scott's, including the push from behind.96  The Eleventh Circuit de-
scribed the events almost nonchalantly, emphasizing the positive aspects
of Harris's driving:
97
91. Harris, 433 F.3d at 810, 814.
92. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1776.
93. Id.
94. Rosen, supra note 2, at 152.
95. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1780 (Breyer, J., concurring).
96. Videotape, Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007) (No. 05-1631), available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/video/scott v_harris.rmvb.
97. Nowhere in its opinion does the Eleventh Circuit confirm that it actually watched the
videotape. Harris v. Coweta County, 433 F.3d 807 (1 1th Cir. 2005), rev'd, 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007).
However, the parties' briefs cite the videotape repeatedly, which indicates its presence in the appel-
late record. See Brief of Defendants-Appellants Mark Fenniger & Timothy Scott at 5-10, Harris v.
Coweta County, 433 F.3d 807 (11 th Cir. 2005) (No. 03-15094); Brief of Plaintiff/Appellee Victor
Harris at 10-19, Harris, 433 F.3d 807 (No. 03-15094); Reply Brief of Defendants-Appellants Mark
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Harris remained in control of his vehicle, slowed for turns and inter-
sections, and typically used his indicators for turns. He did not run
any motorists off the road .... Nor was he a threat to pedestrians in
the shopping center parking lot, which was free from pedestrian and
vehicular traffic as the center was closed. Significantly, by the time
the parties were back on the highway and Scott rammed Harris, the
motorway had been cleared of motorists and pedestrians allegedly
because of police blockades of the nearby intersections.
98
The majority described the same events quite differently, portraying
Harris as a madman set loose on the Georgia highway system:
[W]e see respondent's vehicle racing down narrow, two-lane roads in
the dead of night at speeds that are shockingly fast. We see it swerve
around more than a dozen other cars, cross the double-yellow line,
and force cars traveling in both directions to their respective shoul-
ders to avoid being hit. We see it run multiple red lights and travel
for considerable periods of time in the occasional center left-turn-
only lane, chased by numerous police cars forced to engage in the
same hazardous maneuvers just to keep up.
99
Oddly, both the Eleventh Circuit's version of the chase and the ma-
jority's version are plausible, if not accurate, when compared with the
videotape. Harris did seem to be in control of his vehicle, yet there is no
doubt that he was traveling at very high speeds.100 Harris also signaled
before making turns, but then wildly crossed the double-yellow-line nu-
merous times to pass motorists. 101 And while the highway had been
cleared of most of the traffic due to roadblocks, there is no doubt that the
police officers pursuing Harris had to drive unsafely in order to keep up
with him. 10 2 These interpretive differences suggest that a greater factual
dispute existed than the majority cared to admit. Justice Stevens inci-
sively commented, "[i]f two groups of judges can disagree so vehe-
mently about the nature of the pursuit and the circumstances surrounding
the pursuit, it seems eminently likely that a reasonable juror could dis-
agree with this Court's characterization of events." 10 3 This observation
appears warranted after watching the videotape and comparing the re-
spective interpretations of the Eleventh Circuit and the majority.
Indeed, the majority's interpretation of the videotape has not gone
without criticism. In an excoriating editorial, Jessica Silbey noted that
the majority "disregarded all other evidence and anointed the film ver-
Fenniger and Timothy Scott at 1-3, Harris, 433 F.3d 807 (No. 03-15094). It seems to be a safe
assumption, therefore, that the Eleventh Circuit watched the videotape to inform its decision.
98. Harris, 433 F.3d at 815-16 (citations omitted).
99. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1775.
100. Videotape, supra note 96.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1785 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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sion of the disputed events as the truth."' 0 4 Professor Silbey argued that
the majority's failure
to recognize how all film manifests a distinct point of view (and not
others) and how it is inevitably framed (by the size of the camera and
the length of the film) to exclude what other witnesses to the event
would have seen is a grave error on the part of a fact-finder--or a
film critic. Films never speak for themselves; they require interpreta-
tion.
105
Professor Silbey is not alone in believing that videotape evidence re-
quires a more critical view than the majority seemed to give it in Scott.
A federal appellate judge, after interpreting the events of a videotaped
high-speed pursuit differently than his colleagues, argued in concurrence
that jurors and not judges "ought to be deciding whether the risk posed
by the fleeing suspect is too minimal, or the suspected crime too minor,
to make killing [the suspect] a reasonable way to halt the chase."'
0 6
When considered alongside Justice Stevens's skepticism about the dan-
gerousness of the events on the videotape, and alongside the Eleventh
Circuit's interpretation of the videotape, the majority's interpretation of
the videotape is questionable. As Professor Silbey summarizes, films
always require interpretation: what is left out of the film may be just as
important as what is in it.'0 7 By treating its own interpretation of the
videotape as indisputable fact the majority, much like a Faulknerian nar-
rator, faithfully related what it perceived but nevertheless missed the big
picture.
Although it did go on to analyze with a balancing test the "facts" it
culled from the videotape, the undue weight the majority gave to its in-
terpretation of the videotape tilted the balance in favor of deadly force.
The majority weighed "the risk of bodily harm that Scott's actions posed
to [Harris] in light of the threat to the public that Scott was trying to
eliminate."' 0 8 Conceptually, then, there were two "sides" to this meta-
phorical balance: Harris's "risk of bodily harm" on the one side, and the
"threat to the public" on the other. The majority's interpretation of the
videotape-finding Harris's driving indisputably dangerous-added
weight to the "threat to the public" side of the balance. Although factor-
ing in Justice Stevens's and the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation of the
videotape-finding Harris's driving only debatably dangerous-would
have subtracted weight from the "threat to the public" side of the bal-
ance, the majority declined to consider it. By ignoring Justice Stevens's
and the Eleventh Circuit's interpretations of the videotape, the majority
104. Jessica Silbey, Op-Ed., Justices Taken in by Illusion of Film, BALT. SUN, May 13, 2007,
at 21A.
105. Id.
106. Beshers v. Harrison, 495 F.3d 1260, 1272 (11 th Cir. 2007) (Presnell, J., concurring).
107. Silbey, supra note 104.
108. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1778.
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transmogrified its own interpretation into objective truth and thus
weighted the "threat to the public" side of the balance to reflect a greater
threat than perhaps existed in reality. This greater threat, in turn, urged a
greater necessity for the use of deadly force.
Naturally, Scott's tilted balance will have some effect on future
cases dealing with the use of deadly force in high-speed pursuits. In ap-
plying Scott to these future cases, courts may have to account for not
only the objective reasonableness factors of Graham,109 but the major-
ity's interpretation of the videotape in Scott. Future high-speed pursuits
may, at the very least, be compared with the Scott videotape and the ma-
jority's pronouncements of Harris's indisputable dangerousness. If the
future high-speed pursuit is not less threatening to the public than the
pursuit in Scott (and the majority's interpretation of that threat), the use
of deadly force against the fleeing suspect would be, at least in theory,
almost per se reasonable.
1 10
But Scott's analysis of the videotape will likely reach further than
high-speed pursuit cases. The majority's implication that judges can
interpret videotapes as well as (or better than) jurors seems likely to en-
trust judges with greater interpretational authority at the summary judg-
ment stage. In the Fourth Amendment context, this has the potential to
put the disposition of excessive or deadly force claims much more
squarely into the hands of judges. 11
Although the Eleventh Circuit, following well-established summary
judgment standards,1 2 viewed the videotape in the light most favorable
to Harris, the Supreme Court majority took issue with those standards." 3
Using language bordering on the hyperbolic--characterizing Harris's
version of events as "blatantly contradicted" by the videotape, "utterly
discredited by the record," and "visible fiction"--the majority declared
109. See discussion of Graham supra p. 466.
110. Both Justice Breyer and Justice Stevens complained that Scott set an inflexible, "per se"
rule, at odds with the fact-driven inquiries normally used in Fourth Amendment cases. Scott, 127 S.
Ct. at 1781 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 1785 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Some lower court opinions
have expressed this concern as well. See Beshers, 495 F.3d at 1272 (Presnell, J., concurring) ("For
all of its talk of a balancing test, the Harris court has, in effect, established a per se rule: Unless the
chase occurs below the speed limit on a deserted highway, the use of deadly force to end a motor
vehicle pursuit is always a reasonable seizure.").
111. Cf Alan K. Chen, The Facts About Qualified Immunity, 55 EMORY L.J. 229 (2006).
Professor Chen argues that the Court has a pattern of ignoring the importance of factual disputes in
qualified immunity claims, treating reasonableness as a "pure legal analysis because of its desire that
judges, rather than juries, resolve such claims." Id. at 232. "The Court's characterization of quali-
fied immunity as a question of law," Professor Chen contends, "is not driven by analytical factors
ordinarily applied to the law/fact distinction, but by its purely functional decision to allocate all
decision making concerning qualified immunity to judges." Id. at 264. Professor Chen concludes
that the Court "has shed the doctrine of adherence to conventional understandings of summary
judgment procedure, cavalierly dismissing its strict and detailed requirements for adjudicating fac-
tual issues prior to trial." Id. at 277.
112. Harris v. Coweta County, 433 F.3d 807, 810 (1 th Cir. 2005), rev'd, 127 S. Ct. 1769.
113. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1776.
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that the Eleventh Circuit "should have viewed the facts in the light de-
picted by the videotape."' 14 This declaration assumes, as the majority did
in Scott, that there is only one reasonable interpretation of a videotape.'
5
This assumption of interpretational uniformity suggests that Scott will
provide all judges a similar power to unquestionably rely on their subjec-
tive interpretations of videotapes at the summary judgment stage.
By declaring Justice Stevens's and the Eleventh Circuit's interpreta-
tions of the videotape an impossibility, and relying instead on its own
interpretation, the majority might have added another hurdle to getting
excessive and deadly force claims past summary judgment: the alleged
Fourth Amendment violation must be so egregious that it is unquestion-
able. Close cases-like Scott-may now be disposed on summary judg-
ment because courts are apparently not obligated to view the facts in
light of the nonmoving party if the judge believes that the record does
not warrant this kind of treatment. A number of courts have already ap-
plied this rule. 16 As demonstrated by the differing interpretations of the
videotape in Scott, a "genuine" factual dispute is something quite differ-
ent depending on whose opinion one relies on. Post-Scott summary
judgment standards, allowing a subjective determination of "genuine,"
may turn out to be somewhat less restrained than the majority would
have anticipated.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1775, n.5. During oral argument, several justices shared their interpretations of the
videotape: "He created the scariest chase I ever saw since 'The French Connection,"' exclaimed
Justice Scalia. Transcript of Oral Argument at 24, Scott, 127 S. Ct. 1769 (No. 05-1631). Justice
Alito pointed out that he "looked at the videotape on this" and thought that Harris "created a tremen-
dous risk of [sic] drivers on that road." Id. Justice Ginsburg commented that Harris clearly endan-
gered the lives and safety of others: "Anyone who has watched that tape has got to come to that
conclusion, looking at the road and the way that this car was swerving, and the cars coming in the
opposite direction. This was a situation fraught with danger." Id. at 36. Justice Breyer questioned
the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation of the videotape, asking: "But suppose I look at the tape and I
end up with Chico Marx's old question with respect to the Court of Appeals: Who do you believe,
me or your own eyes?" Id. at 49.
116. See, e.g., Beshers v. Harrison, 495 F.3d 1260, 1262 (1 1th Cir. 2007) (Presnell, J., concur-
ring) ("[In this case, as in [Scott], we have the benefit of viewing two videotapes from the patrol
cars involved in the pursuit. Thus, to the extent Appellant's version of the facts is clearly contra-
dicted by the videotapes, such that no reasonable jury could believe it, we do not adopt his factual
allegations."); Sharp v. Fisher, No. 406-CV-020, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54535, at *3 (S.D. Ga. July
26, 2007) ("[B]ecause [the] evidence includes three different videos of the [high-speed pursuit] in
question, the Court 'views the facts in the light depicted by the video[s]."'); Martinez v. City of
Auburn, No. C06-0447, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49236, at *3 (W.D. Wash. July 9, 2007) (Because
"[t]he Supreme Court has recently endorsed reliance in [videotape] evidence,. . . the Court outlines
the events that lead [sic] to the shooting as shown in the video ...."); Miller v. Jensen, No. 06-CV-
0328, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39252, at *I I (N.D. Okla. May 29, 2007) ("Even though plaintiff is
the nonmoving party, the Court will not adopt plaintiffs version of the facts if it clearly contradicts
the factual depictions in the videotapes."); Mott v. City of McCall, No. CV-06-063, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 35241, at *2-3 (D. Idaho May 14, 2007) ("[F]or purposes of Defendants' summary judgment
motion, the Court will view the facts in the light most favor [sic] to Plaintiff, except for those facts
that are depicted by the videotape.").
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B. Refusal to Consider Alternatives to Deadly Force
As disturbed as the majority apparently was by the videotaped pur-
suit, it is not surprising that the it rejected Harris's suggestion that the
public's safety could have been equally well maintained had the officers
simply ceased their pursuit and let Harris "escape." '"1 7 In rejecting this
argument, the majority pointed out that ceasing pursuit would not have
ensured that Harris would have suddenly begun to drive normally again
and, therefore, the public would still be in danger." 18 But the majority's
analysis is suspect because it did not consider alternatives to end the pur-
suit other than complete cessation or deadly force. In fact, a number of
feasible alternatives existed between these two extremes that could have
ended the pursuit without injury to the public, the police, or the perpetra-
tor.119
By refusing to take these alternatives into account, the majority
painted itself into a syllogistic comer: ending high-speed pursuits pro-
tects the public; deadly force is guaranteed to end a high-speed pursuit;
therefore, in order to protect the public, deadly force must be used to end
high-speed pursuits. This overly simplified approach created an artificial
dichotomy of complete cessation or deadly force that lent deadly force a
semblance of objective reasonableness that it may not have deserved. By
relying on this artificial dichotomy, the majority had no need to recog-
nize that Deputy Scott had a third option, and this tilted the balance in
favor of deadly force. Under Scott, courts do not appear to have any
responsibility to factor alternative options for ending high-speed pursuits
into their balancing analyses; rather, they are free to rely on the major-
ity's artificial dichotomy. Furthermore, by taking a firm stance in sup-
port of deadly force, Scott may have inadvertently discouraged law en-
forcement agencies' adoption and use of alternative options for ending
high-speed pursuits.
The majority's position-that ceasing pursuit would not have been
as effective as the use of deadly force-is a disputable one. Indeed, one
survey found that seventy percent of "jailed suspects who had been in-
volved in a high-speed pursuit.., would have slowed down if police had
terminated the pursuit."' 20 Although the post-capture ponderings of sus-
pects likely facing substantial jail time are perhaps not the most reliable
predictor of future suspects' behavior, some commentators have come to
a similar conclusion by focusing less on the role of the suspect in the
pursuit and more on the role of the police.
117. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1778.
118. Id. at 1779.
119. Id. at 1783.
120. Patrick T. O'Connor & William L. Norse, Jr., Police Pursuits: A Comprehensive Look at
the Broad Spectrum of Police Pursuit Liability and Law, 57 MERCER L. REV. 511, 513 (2005-06).
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Kathryn R. Urbonya suggests that police, by engaging in a pursuit,
exert "psychological force" on the suspect.' 2' The act of pursuit "not
only communicate[s] a command to stop, but also that the police will
continue to pursue until the individual stops.' 1 2 The psychological force
in a pursuit creates a vicious cycle: the more the police gain on a sus-
pect's vehicle, the faster the suspect will go in order to get away. 23 The
police, in turn, will increase their speed to keep up with the suspect.
24
The entire process carries on, presumably, until the vehicles reach their
mechanical limits. Thinking of a high-speed pursuit in terms of psycho-
logical force puts the pursuit squarely in the control of the police: "By
abandoning the pursuit, the psychological force compelling the [suspect]
to continue the pursuit ceases."' 25 If Professor Urbonya is correct, many
high-speed pursuits could be safely terminated by simply letting the sus-
pect go.
Whatever validity Professor Urbonya's theory may have, it is of
course inapplicable unless the police decide to actually pursue a suspect.
Although most commentators agree that the police should sometimes be
permitted to engage in high-speed pursuits, there is substantial disagree-
ment over when.' 26 Because the vast majority of high-speed pursuits do
not involve suspects whose underlying offenses pose a great danger to
society, 127 Travis N. Jensen argues that high-speed pursuits should be
limited to "violent felony suspects" whose escape would imperil soci-
ety.12 8  To facilitate this, Jensen puts forward a "categorical approach"
that would obviate the need for officers to "perform a complex balancing
test in the seconds before each decision to pursue.',12 9  "It is clear," he
121. Kathryn R. Urbonya, The Constitutionality of High-Speed Pursuits Under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments, 35 ST. Louis U. L.J. 205, 233 (1991).
122. Id. at 234.
123. See id. at 235 n. 153 ("At a dog race, in order to make the dogs run faster, a metal frame is
placed in front of them with the appearance of a rabbit on it. The dogs' pace increases as the speed
of the frame moves faster.... [T]he police officers' vehicle represents a similar kind of compulsion
to the pursued driver, except this time the force is behind the driver.").
124. Id.
125. Id. at 234-35.
126. See, e.g., Michael Douglas Owens, Comment, The Inherent Constitutionality of the Police
Use of Deadly Force to Stop Dangerous Pursuits, 52 MERCER L. REv. 1599 (2001). Owens, a
former sheriff's deputy-turned-law student, argues that police officers are always constitutionally
justified to end high-speed pursuits through deadly force. Id. at 1600. Owens posits that a person
fleeing the police in a vehicle always presents a threat of death or serious physical harm to others.
Id. at 1631. This threat from a suspect who "has a two thousand-pound weapon at his fingertips," he
writes, is sufficient to warrant the use of deadly force. Id. at 1632. Furthermore, Owens points out
that the reasonableness of the use of deadly force should be "judged solely with reference to the
danger presented by the suspect's flight"-not by the suspect's underlying offense. Id. at 1633.
Because evading the police is a crime in and of itself, Owens argues, the "predicate offense for
which the stop was initiated" becomes irrelevant: it is the pursuit that endangers the public, not the
initial offense. Id. at 1635.
127. A high-speed pursuit's most frequent impetus is a minor traffic offense. O'Connor &
Norse, supra note 120, at 512; Urbonya, supra note 121, at 225.
128. Travis N. Jensen, Note, Cooling the Hot Pursuit: Toward a Categorical Approach, 73
IND. L.J. 1277, 1292 (1998).
129. Id.
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writes, "that a suspect's escape must equal [a pursuit's] inherent risk to
society before a pursuit could be justified." 130  Pursuits over "minor
crimes and traffic violations," Jensen concludes, are unacceptable.
31
Assuming that fewer high-speed pursuits create fewer injuries, it may be
safer for police to not engage in pursuits at all.
13 2
But neither Professor Urbonya's theory of slowing a high-speed
pursuit by letting the suspect go, nor Jensen's proposal of summarily
avoiding high-speed pursuits, answer a question that seemed crucial to
the holding in Scott: namely, if Deputy Scott would have discontinued
the pursuit, how would Harris have known that the pursuit was over?
Harris, the majority posited, "might have been just as likely to respond
by continuing to drive recklessly as by slowing down and wiping his
brow." 33 Rather than "tak[ing] that chance and hop[ing] for the best,"
the majority concluded that "Scott's action-ramming [Harris] off the
road-was certain to eliminate the risk that [Harris] posed to the
public ... ,,134
The majority's question is more than mere conjecture: at least one
survey of fleeing suspects revealed that they "often did not know
whether a pursuit had been called off.' 35 Even so, the majority failed to
consider alternative options that may have been equally "certain" to
eliminate the risk Harris posed to the public. Perhaps the most available
alternative is the "stopstick." This device is a spiked strip that is carried
in the trunk of a police car. 13 6 An officer deploys the stopstick in the
path of the suspect's vehicle and, after the suspect passes over it, the
officer pulls the stopstick off the road to allow the pursuing police vehi-
cles to pass.' 37 The spikes from the stopstick puncture the suspect's tires
and allow them to slowly deflate, bringing the vehicle to a controlled
stop.138 Also available is "air support and photographic evidence of iden-
tity."'3 9 Although a small department like the one Deputy Scott belonged
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1277.
132. Police departments have indeed implemented policies similar to that proposed by Jensen:
after adopting a policy restricting pursuits to violent felonies, for example, the Metro-Dade Police
Department reduced its pursuits from 279 in 1992 to 51 in 1993. Geoffrey P. Alpert, Andrew C.
Clarke & William C. Smith, The Constitutional Implications of High-Speed Police Pursuits Under a
Substantive Due Process Analysis: Homeward Through the Haze, 27 U. MEM. L. REV. 599, 621
(1996-97). Likewise, the Houston Police Department experienced a 40 percent drop in pursuits after
adopting a more restrictive pursuit policy. Id.
133. Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1778 (2007).
134. Id. at 1778-79
135. O'Connor & Norse, supra note 120, at 513.
136. John Hill, High-Speed Police Pursuits: Dangers, Dynamics, and Risk Reduction, FBI




139. Jensen, supra note 128, at 1294.
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to probably could not afford to operate a helicopter, 140 it definitely could
afford video equipment (as evidenced by the videotape of the chase).
With the suspect's license plate number and criminal activity clearly
recorded on videotape, the police could arrest him at a later time by sim-
ply showing up at his residence. Finally, as Justice Stevens suggested in
his dissent, "a simple warning issued from a loudspeaker ... could have
avoided such a tragic result."
' 14'
Though theories such as Professor Urbonya's, policy proposals such
as Jensen's, and devices such as the stopstick are all somewhat imper-
fect, they would necessarily affect the outcome of a Fourth Amendment
balancing analysis. In Scott, however, the majority proceeded as if these
alternatives did not exist: because Harris "intentionally placed himself
and the public in danger by unlawfully engaging in [a] reckless, high-
speed flight" and ignored the implied warnings of the "[m]ultiple police
cars, with blue lights flashing and sirens blaring, [that] had been chasing
[him] for nearly 10 miles," it was Harris who "ultimately produced the
choice between two evils that Scott confronted.' 42 The problem with
this conclusion is that Deputy Scott had a choice between more than
"two evils."
Because it assumed that only deadly force would ensure the public's
safety, and that the public's safety took priority over the "risk of bodily
harm" to Harris, the majority unqualifiedly found Deputy Scott's use of
deadly force to be objectively reasonable.143 But the majority's objective
reasonableness analysis rests on a questionable premise. By classifying
complete cessation as allowing Harris to continue endangering the pub-
lic, and deadly force as preventing Harris from endangering the public,
the majority left itself with no real choice: of course Harris should be
prevented from endangering the public. Any reasonable officer in the
same circumstances-that is, a reasonable officer shackled by an artifi-
cial dichotomy of complete cessation or deadly force-would have used
such force. 144 The "threat to the public" side of the metaphorical balance
(already heavily weighted by the majority's interpretation of the video-
tape) would have been weighted even more if Deputy Scott had com-
pletely ceased the pursuit and let Harris drive on and further endanger the
public. Under the artificial dichotomy, therefore, Deputy Scott's only
objectively reasonable option was deadly force.
Yet had the majority taken pursuit psychology into account, Deputy
Scott's use of deadly force may have looked less objectively reasonable
140. The Coweta County Sheriffs Department is comprised of 54 officers who patrol 442
square miles of rural Coweta County and, apparently, do not possess a helicopter. Coweta County
Sheriff's Office, http://www.cowetaso.com/Patrol.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2007).
141. Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1785 (2007).
142. Id. at 1778.
143. Id. at 1779.
144. See discussion of Graham supra p. 466.
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in light of the theory that pursuit causes a fleeing suspect to drive faster.
Had the majority taken the lack of a categorical pursuit policy 145 into
account, Deputy Scott's use of deadly force may have looked less objec-
tively reasonable in light of the fact that the pursuit stemmed from an
insignificant traffic violation. 146 And had the majority taken the failure
to use stopsticks or issue a loudspeaker warning before resorting to
deadly force into account, Deputy Scott's use of deadly force may have
looked less objectively reasonable in light of the relative ease by which
these measures could have been taken. Of course none of these alterna-
tives, which all happen to fall somewhere between complete cessation
and deadly force, were ever considered by the majority in deciding the
objective reasonableness of Deputy Scott's use of deadly force.
The majority's artificial dichotomy of complete cessation or deadly
force may go well beyond the immediate result in Scott. First, it poten-
tially relieves courts of the responsibility to factor in alternative methods
of ending high-speed pursuits. Courts may be able to decide whether a
high-speed pursuit warranted deadly force without addressing all of an
officer's available options. Second, it may also have inadvertently set
back law enforcement agencies' adoption of safer methods of stopping
fleeing suspects by failing to provide any incentive for their implementa-
tion.
Although courts have characterized Garner as asking whether "a
reasonable non-deadly alternative exist[ed] for apprehending the sus-
pect," 147 Scott's holding seems to override this concern for alternatives in
high-speed pursuit scenarios. Even the importance of Graham's factors
for determining objective reasonableness-the severity of the crime, the
immediacy of the threat, the suspect's resistance, and the potential for
evasion-48 -seem diminished in light of the majority's artificial dichot-
omy. Rather, Scott directs courts to consider only the certainty of deadly
force, or the uncertainty of complete cessation. 149 Some courts have al-
ready embraced this rationale. 150
145. The Coweta County Sheriff's Department had a pursuit policy which left "decisions
regarding the initiation, continuation, and termination of pursuits.., to the discretion of the officer
and supervisor in the field." Harris v. Coweta County, No. 01-CV-148, at *6 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 25,
2003) (order denying in part summary judgment). This "judgmental" policy is substantially more
liberal than the "categorical" policy advocated by Jensen.
146. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1772.
147. Brower v. County of lnyo, 884 F.2d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir. 1989).
148. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).
149. Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1778-79.
150. The Eleventh Circuit held, for example, that an officer reasonably used deadly force when
he rammed the vehicle of a fleeing suspect whom the officer suspected of driving under the influ-
ence. Beshers v. Harrison, No. 05-17096, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 19289, at *1 (11 th Cir. Aug. 14,
2007). The collision caused the suspect's vehicle to roll over several times, resulting in the suspect's
death. Id. at *5. The court reasoned that, because Scott "specifically rejected the notion that police
can protect the public by ceasing a pursuit," the officer's only reasonable option to ensure public
safety was to use deadly force against the suspect. Id. at *20-21. Similarly, the Fourth Circuit held
that an officer's decision to ram a fleeing motorcyclist off the road, which resulted in the motorcy-
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Fourth Amendment reasonableness for the use of deadly force, even
before Scott, never insisted that courts second-guess the judgment of a
reasonable officer on the scene. 15 1 But with the many options to termi-
nate high-speed pursuits other than complete cessation or deadly force,
the majority's artificial dichotomy ignores the tools that are readily
available to reasonable officers on the scene. Under the majority's
analysis in Scott, therefore, courts do not have to account for objective
reality in determining objective reasonableness.
A further ramification of the majority's artificial dichotomy may be
its effect on law enforcement agencies. Although the trend in law en-
forcement has been toward adopting restrictive pursuit policies and de-
ploying alternative devices for terminating pursuits,1 12 Scott failed to
offer any kind of incentive to continue this trend. While officer safety is
a constant concern in attempting to end high-speed pursuits, the threat of
litigation, too, has loomed over law enforcement in high-speed pursuit
situations.153 Scott may have removed the threat of litigation as a check
against officers' use of deadly force in high-speed pursuits. It may also
have taken away law enforcement agencies' incentives to invest in the
development of restrictive pursuit policies and the adoption of alternative
tools to end pursuits. If it discourages law enforcement agencies from
adopting alternatives to deadly force, the majority's artificial dichotomy
may indeed prove a self-fulfilling prophesy.
CONCLUSION
It is true that the majority did not resurrect the draconian common
law precept of allowing officers to kill fleeing suspects rather than pur-
sue them. Far from it: the majority faithfully applied the Fourth Amend-
ment balancing test developed by Garner and Graham. But tilting the
metaphorical balance in favor of deadly force by relying on questionable
factual premises has the potential to compel similar results. After Scott,
the use of deadly force in high-speed pursuits appears almost per se rea-
sonable. And in cases where videotape evidence is presented, it looks as
if judges rather than juries have the final word in resolving questions of
reasonableness. Furthermore, Scott may free courts from analyzing all of
an officer's options for terminating a high-speed pursuit, and may also
clist's death, was reasonable under Scott because "an officer's decision whether to let a suspect go in
the hopes of catching him later is not governed by just how dangerous the suspect can make the
pursuit." Abney v. Coe, No. 06-1607, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 15841, at *17 (4th Cir. July 3, 2007).
The court wrote that the officer faced a "dreadful choice" of complete cessation or deadly force. Id.
at *18. Following Scott's artificial dichotomy, the court concluded that the officer's only option to
protect the public was deadly force. Id.
151. See discussion of objective reasonableness supra p. 465-66.
152. Alpert, Clarke & Smith, supra note 132, at 604-06.
153. Erik Savas, Comment, Hot Pursuit: When Police Pursuits Run Over Constitutional Lines,
1998 DET. C.L. REV. 857, 858-59 (1998).
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have reduced law enforcement agencies' incentives to adopt alternatives
to deadly force for ending high-speed pursuits.
As Justice Stevens posited in his dissenting opinion, the answer to
the question of whether an officer reasonably used deadly force to end a
high-speed pursuit depends on the particular circumstances: it "may be
an obvious 'yes,' an obvious 'no,' or sufficiently doubtful that the ques-
tion.., should be decided by a jury, after a review of the degree of dan-
ger and the alternatives available to the officer." 154 But by concluding
that no reasonable jury could disagree with its interpretation of the video-
tape, and analyzing objective reasonableness in the context of an artifi-
cial dichotomy of complete cessation or deadly force, the Scott majority
took the decision from the hands of the jury and the constraints of reality,
and set a precedent of imbalance and unreasonableness.
Forrest Plesko*
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